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REML A. MABUS,
PETITIONER/APPELLEE,
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v.
G. BARTON BLACKSTOCK, BUREAU CHIEF,
DRIVERS' LICENSE DIVISION, DEPARTMENT
OF PUBLIC SAFETY, STATE OF UTAH,

CASENO-981668-CA

RESPONDENT/APPELLANT.

REPLY BRIEF

This reply brief responds to Points IV, VIII, and IX.1
REPLY TO POINT IV

Mabus claims this case would not make good precedent because the 1999 Utah
Legislature changed the law regarding the provision here at issue. He asserts that the
amendments changed the report-submission deadline from five to ten days and made
submission procedural rather than substantive. Brief of Petitioner at 13. Regarding the
deadline, the change from five to ten days is irrelevant to the legal issue. If, as Mabus
argues, submission of the report within five days was a jurisdictional prerequisite in 1998,

1

This does not mean, of course, that respondent concedes the validity or
accuracy of the other points in Mabus's brief.
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then submission within ten days under the amendment is still a prerequisite in 1999. The
change only constituted a lengthening of the time limit.
The essential issue here is not the time limit itself, but its jurisdictional effect, if
any. Mabus argues that failure to submit and failure to submit within the time frame has
jurisdictional significance; respondent claims it does not. Whether that deadline is five or
ten days makes no difference to this case or its precedential effect.
Mabus also alleges that addition of the clause, ff[a]s a matter of procedure" at the
beginning of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10(d) (Supp. 1999) transforms submission of the
report from a substantive to a procedural mandate. Here, Mabus strikes at the heart of the
disagreement in this case, i.e., the legal meaning of the five-day submission rule (which is
now a ten-day rule). Mabus asserts that the change evidences the legislature's desire to
make the rule a procedural requirement. To the contrary, the proper way to look at the
amendment is as clarification of the legislature's original meaning and an attempt to
correct a court's mistaken interpretation of previous language. 1 A, Norman J. Singer,
Sutherland Statutory Construction § 22.01 (5th ed. 1993).
This Court nicely illustrated the principle in State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 545-46
(Utah App. 1998). There, the legislature had amended Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-405(b)
(Supp. 1997) after Bryant's trial. In discussing the effect of the amendment, this Court
ruled that, by Mconstru[ing] and clarifying] a prior statute[, the amendment] will be
accepted as the legislative declaration of the original act." Amendment of an ambiguous
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statute indicates a legislature purpose to clarify the ambiguities in the statute rather than
to change the law." Bryant, 965 P.2d at 546; see also State v. Arbon, 909 P.2d 1270,
1275 n.4 (Utah App.), cert denied, 916 P.2d 909 (Utah 1996) (such an amendment "may
intimate that the Legislature has become aware that the earlier language could be
misconstrued as defendants have done.").
As seen with the footnote in this Court's 1988 decision in Moore v. Schwendiman,
750 P.2d 204,205 n.l (Utah App. 1998), the 1988 amendments to Section 41-6-44.10
were not there directly at issue and, consequently, were not decided authoritatively. The
obiter dicta nature of the footnote made that statute ambiguous. Though it took several
years, the Utah Legislature clarified that ambiguity with the 1999 amendment. It is also
possible that the amendment was a reaction to the lower court's interpretation of the
statute in this case.
Consequently, rather than evidencing a change in the report submission rulefroma
substantive to a procedural requirement as Mabus alleges, the 1999 amendment actually
supports respondent's interpretation of the 1988 amendment to section 41-6-44.10, which
was in effect when Mabus was stopped for DUI. Under that interpretation, the five-day
submission rule has been a procedural one since 1988. As a matter of procedure,
submission within that timeframegives the Drivers' License Division earlier notice that a
revocation is proceeding, thus implementing the primary purpose of revocation, i.e.,
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"protecting persons on highways by quickly removing from the highways those persons
who have shown they are safety hazards." Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-222 (1995).
REPLY TO POINT VIII

Mabus argues that because the trial court did not h*ve a record of the division's
license-suspension hearing, it could not have "reviewed" the agency's decision in an
appellate manner. To the extent this assertion represents respondent's claim as asserting
that the trial court should have engaged in appellate review, it misreads respondent's
appeal. Respondent recognizes that trial court review of informal adjudicative
proceedings is by a new trial in the court, not by review of the agency record. See
Cordova v. Blackstock, 861 P.2d 449 (Utah App. 1993). Therefore, respondent asks
neither this Court nor the trial court to make findings based on the agency record.
What respondent asks instead is simple: that the Mabus be confined strictly to the
four comers of the petition filed in the trial court. The language in Utah Code Ann. § 63
46b-15(2)(a) mandates a level of specificity not required under the statutory regime
present in Moore2 or in general civil complaints. Utah R.Civ.P. (8)(a) (1999) (requiring
only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief1). Mabus did not, however, allege that the Drivers' License Division failed to
establish a jurisdictional prerequisite. Because subsection 63-46b-15(2)(a) (1996)
requires the allegation of "facts demonstrating that the party seeking judicial review is
2

Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10 (1981) (amended 1988).
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entitled to obtain judicial review" and a "statement of the reasons why the Mabus is
entitled to relief," Mabus was required to aver in the petition failure to submit a signed
report within five days. The petition did not allege a failure to comply with the five-day
rule; consequently, that issue is waived. See Utah R.Civ. P. 15(b) (1999); Worrall v.
Ogden City Fire Dep /, 616 P.2d 598, 602 (Utah 1980); Wright v. University of Utah, 876
P.2d 380, 384-85 (Utah App. 1994).
REPLY TO POINT IX

Mabus claims in his responsive brief that respondent failed to marshal the
evidence. However vital marshaling may be in appellate practice, it is unnecessary here
because respondent does not challenge any of the trial court's factual findings.3 Rather,
respondent challenges solely the trial court's legal conclusion that "failure to submit a
signed report... is fatal to the revocation process" {Id.). Because respondent does not
allege that the facts are wrong, marshaling is irrelevant. State v. Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450,

3

The trial court made only twofindingsof fact:
1.

Petitioner is a resident of Salt
Lake County;

2.

No evidence was presented that
the peace officer submitted a
signed report as required by Utah
Code Annotated §41-644.10(2)(d).

(R. 91).
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460 (Utah 1994) ("To provefindingsof fact clearly erroneous an appellant must marshal
all evidence

").

In other words, if this Court agrees with respondent that submission of the report
within five days is neither a jurisdictional prerequisite to, nor element of, revocation, then
the case can simply be remanded to the trial court. It will then be the job of the trial court
to review the transcript of the hearing and determine whether respondent proved the truly
necessary elements of revocation.
CONCLUSION

This Court should reverse the trial court's Conclusion of Law No. 44 and remand
for that court to apply correct law to the evidence established at the hearing.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS 2l June 1999.
JAN GRAHAM
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL

JAMES H. BEADLES
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL

4

"The failure of the peace officer to submit a signed report as required by
Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-44.10(2)(d) is fatal to the revocation process" (R. 91).
Page 6 of 7

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
0n*~2_ June 1999,1 mailed, by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, a copy of this
REPLY BRIEF to:
D. SCOTT LITTLE
140 West 9000 South, Suite 6
Sandy, Utah 84070-2006

- i
(

Page 7 of 7

7

ADDENDUM

1999 VERSION OF UTAH CODE ANN. 41-6-44.10
(AMENDMENTS IN BOLD)

41-6-44.10. Implied consent to chemical tests for alcohol or drug - Number of tests
— Refusal — Warning, report — Hearing, revocation of license — Appeal — Person incapable
of refusal — Results of test available — Who may give test — Evidence.
(1) (a) A person operating a motor vehicle in this state is considered to have given his
consent to a chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, or urine for the purpose of determining
whether he was operating or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while having a blood or
breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited under Section 41-6-44, 53-3-231, or 53-3-232, while
jnder the influence of alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol and any drug under Section
41-6-44, or while having any measurable controlled substance or metabolite of a controlled
substance in the person's body in violation of Section 41-6-44.6, if the test is or tests are
administered at the direction of a peace officer having grounds to believe that person to have
been operating or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while having a blood or breath
alcohol content statutorily prohibited under Section 41-6-44,53-3-231, or 53-3-232, or while
under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol and any drug under Section
41-6-44, or while having any measurable controlled substance or metabolite of a controlled
substance in the person's body in violation of Section 41-6-44.6.
(b) (i) The peace officer determines which of the tests are administered and how many of
them are administered.
(ii) If an officer requests more than one test, refusal by a person to take one or more
requested tests, even though he does submit to any other requested test or tests, is a refusal under
this section.
(c) (i) A person who has been requested under this section to submit to a chemical test or
tests of his breath, blood, or urine, may not select the test or tests to be administered.
(ii) The failure or inability of a peace officer to arrange for any specific chemical test is
not a defense to taking a test requested by a peace officer, and it is not a defense in any criminal,
civil, or administrative proceeding resulting from a person's refusal to submit to the requested
test or tests.
(2) (a) If the person has been placed under arrest, has then been requested by a peace
officer to submit to any one or more of the chemical tests under Subsection (1), and refuses to
submit to any chemical test requested, the person shall be warned by the peace officer requesting
the test or tests that a refusal to submit to the test or tests can result in revocation of the person's
license to operate a motor vehicle.
(b) Following the warning under Subsection (a), if the person does not immediately
request that the chemical test or tests as offered by a peace officer be administered a peace officer
shall serve on the person, on behalf of the Driver License Division, immediate notice of the
Driver License Division's intention to revoke the person's privilege or license to operate a motor
vehicle. When the officer serves the immediate notice on behalf of the Driver License Division,
he shall:
(i) take the Utah license certificate or permit, if any, of the operator;
(ii) issue a temporary license effective for only 29 days; and
(iii) supply to the operator, on a form approved by the Driver License Division, basic
information regarding how to obtain a hearing before the Driver License Division.
(c) A citation issued by a peace officer may, if approved as to form by the Driver License
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Division, serve also as the temporary license.
(d) As a matter of procedure, the peace officer shall submit a signed report, within ten
days after the date of the arrest, that he had grounds to believe the arrested person had been
operating or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while having a blood or breath
alcohol content statutorily prohibited under Section 41-6-44, 53-3-231, or 53-3-232, or while
under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol and any drug under Section
41-6-44, or while having any measurable controlled substance or metabolite of a controlled
substance in the person's body in violation of Section 41-6-44.6, and that the person had refused
to submit to a chemical test or tests under Subsection (1).
(e) (i) A person who has been notified of the Driver License Division's intention to
revoke his license under this section is entitled to a hearing.
(ii) A request for the hearing shall be made in writing within ten days after the date of the
arrest.
(iii) Upon written request, the division shall grant to the person an opportunity to be
heard within 29 days after the date of arrest.
(iv) If the person does not make a timely written request for a hearing before the
division, his privilege to operate a motor vehicle in the state is revoked beginning on the 30th
day after the date of arrest for a period of:
(A) one year unless Subsection (2)(e)(iv)(B) applies; or
(B) 18 months if the person has had a previous license sanction after July 1,1993, under
this section, Section 41-6-44.6, 53-3-223, 53-3-231, 53-3-232, or a conviction after July 1,1993,
under Section 41-6-44.
(f) If a hearing is requested by the person, the hearing shall be conducted by the Driver
License Division in the county in which the offense occurred, unless the division and the person
both agree that the hearing may be held in some other county.
(g) The hearing shall be documented and shall cover the issues of:
(i) whether a peace officer had reasonable grounds to believe that a person was operating
a motor vehicle in violation of Section 41-6-44,41-6-44.6, or 53-3-231; and
(ii) whether the person refused to submit to the test,
(h) (i) In connection with the hearing, the division or its authorized agent:
(A) may administer oaths and may issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and
the production of relevant books and papers; and
(B) shall issue subpoenas for the attendance of necessary peace officers.
(ii) The division shall pay witness fees and mileage from the Transportation Fund in
accordance with the rates established in Section 21-5-4.
(i) If after a hearing, the Driver License Division determines that the person was
requested to submit to a chemical test or tests and refused to submit to the test or tests, or if the
person fails to appear before the Driver License Division as required in the notice, the Driver
License Division shall revoke his license or permit to operate a motor vehicle in Utah beginning
on the date the hearing is held for a period of:
(i) (A) one year unless Subsection (2)(i)(i)(B) applies; or
(B) 18 months if the person has had a previous license sanction after July 1,1993, under
this section, Section 41-6-44.6, 53-3-223, 53-3-231, 53-3-232, or a conviction after July 1,1993,
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under Section 41-6-44.
(ii) The Driver License Division shall also assess against the person, in addition to any
fee imposed under Subsection 53-3-205(14), a fee under Section 53-3-105, which shall be paid
before the person's driving privilege is reinstated, to cover administrative costs.
(iii) The fee shall be cancelled if the person obtains an unappealed court decision
following a proceeding allowed under this Subsection (2) that the revocation was improper.
(j) (i) Any person whose license has been revoked by the Driver License Division under
this section may seek judicial review.
(ii) Judicial review of an informal adjudicative proceeding is a trial. Venue is in the
district court in the county in which the offense occurred.
(3) Any person who is dead, unconscious, or in any other condition rendering him
incapable of refusal to submit to any chemical test or tests is considered to not have withdrawn
the consent provided for in Subsection (1), and the test or tests may be administered whether the
person has been arrested or not.
(4) Upon the request of the person who was tested, the results of the test or tests shall be
made available to him.
(5) (a) Only a physician, registered nurse, practical nurse, or person authorized under
Section 26-1-30, acting at the request of a peace officer, may withdraw blood to determine the
alcoholic or drug content. This limitation does not apply to taking a urine or breath specimen.
(b) Any physician, registered nurse, practical nurse, or person authorized under Section
26-1-30 who, at the direction of a peace officer, draws a sample of blood from any person whom
a peace officer has reason to believe is driving in violation of this chapter, or hospital or medical
facility at which the sample is drawn, is immunefromany civil or criminal liability arising from
drawing the sample, if the test is administered according to standard medical practice.
(6) (a) The person to be tested may, at his own expense, have a physician of his own
choice administer a chemical test in addition to the test or tests administered at the direction of a
peace officer.
(b) The failure or inability to obtain the additional test does not affect admissibility of the
results of the test or tests taken at the direction of a peace officer, or preclude or delay the test or
tests to be taken at the direction of a peace officer.
(c) The additional test shall be subsequent to the test or tests administered at the direction
of a peace officer.
(7) For the purpose of determining whether to submit to a chemical test or tests, the
person to be tested does not have the right to consult an attorney or have an attorney, physician,
or other person present as a condition for the taking of any test.
(8) If a person under arrest refuses to submit to a chemical test or tests or any additional
test under this section, evidence of any refusal is admissible in any civil or criminal action or
proceeding arising out of acts alleged to have been committed while the person was operating or
in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, any drug,
combination of alcohol and any drug, or while having any measurable controlled substance or
metabolite of a controlled substance in the person's body.
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